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The economics of international environmental agreements

Batabyal Amitrajeet A

The economics of international environmental agreements - Aldershot Ashgate 2000 - 264p xi

Table of contents
The problem of global environmental protection,
Scott Barrett;
global environmental problems - the effects of unilateral actions taken by one country, Michael Hoel;
creating a good atmosphere - minimum participation for tackling the greenhouse effect, Jane Black, M. Levi and D. De Meza; Strategies for the international protection of the environment, Carlo Carraro and D. Siniscalco;
self-enforcing international environmental agreements, Scott Barrett;
environmental consciousness and moral hazard in international agreements to protect the environment, Emmanuel Petrakis and A. Xepapadeas;
negotiating an agreement on global warning - a theoretical analysis, Zhiqu Chen;
the effects of collusion and limited liability on the design of international environmental agreements for developing countries, Amit Batabyal;
political institutions and pollution control, roger D. Congleton;
efficiency and distribution in greenhouse negotiations, Johan Eyckmans, S. Proost and E. Schokkaert;
a Finnish-Soviet acid rain game - non-co-operative equilibria, cost efficient and sulphur agreements, Olli Tahvonen, V. Kaitala and M. Phojola;
voluntary provision of a public good - results from a real world experiment, Werher W. Pommerehne, Lars P. Feld adn A. hart;
the voluntary provision of a pure public good - the case of reduced CFC emissions and the Montreal Protocol, James C. Murdoch and T. Sandler;
a tale of two collectives - sulphur versus nitrogen oxides emission reduction in Europe, James C. Murdoch, T. Sandler and K. Sargent.

9781840148947


1. International Environmental Law2. Environmental Economics3. Sustainable Development4. Environmental Polocy - International Co-operation - Economic Aspects

341.762000 / BAT