Law and economics of mergers and acquisitions / edited by Steven M. Davidoff, Associate Professor of Law and Finance, Michael E. Moritz College of Law, Ohio State University, USA and Claire A. Hill, Professor and James L. Krusemark Chair in Law, Director, Institute for Law and Rationality, University of Minnesota Law School, USA.

Includes bibliographical references (pages vii-viii).

Contents
Acknowledgements
Introduction Steven M. Davidoff and Claire A. Hill
PART I BACKGROUND: HISTORY, RATIONALES AND OUTCOMES
l. Henry G. Manne t 1965), 'Mergers and the Market for Corporate
Control' , Journul rt'Politicul Econonry'.73 (2), April. I l0-20 3
2. Michael C. Jensen ( 1989), 'Eclipse of the Public Corporation',
Han,arcl Busines.s Review.67. September-October,6l-14 14
3. Bernard S. Black ( 1989), 'Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers',
Stanford Lau' Revieu'. 41 (3). February.597-660 28
4. Robert F. Bruner (2004). 'Does M&A Pay?' , rn Applied Mergers
trnd Acquisitiort.s, Chapter 3. Hoboken. NJ: John Wiley and Sons.
Inc., 30-65, references 92
5. Ulrike Malmendier and Geoffrey Tate (2008). 'Who Makes
Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market's Reaction',
Joumal o.f Finunciul Ec'ortom ics. 89 (l). July, 20J3 133
PART II WHAT M&A LAWYERS DO
6. Ronald J. Gilson ( 1984). 'Valr.re Creation by Business Lawyers:
Legal Skills and Asset Pricing' , Yule Luv' Journul.94 (2).
December.239-313 159
7 . Claire A. Hill (2001 ), 'Why Contracts are Written in "Legalese"'.
Chic:ttgo-Kent Lutt' Reviev'.77 (1).59-85 234
8. John C. Coates IV tZOOI). 'Explaining Veiriation in Takeover
Defenses: Blarne the Lawyers'. Califrtrniu Luvt' Reviev'.89 (5).
1301121 261
9. Claire A. Hill (2009). 'Bar-uaining in the Shadow of the Lawsuit: A
Sociaf Norms Theory of Incomplete Contracts'. Deluttare Journal
oJ'Corporctte Lov'.34. l9l-220 382
PART III HOW DEALS ARE DONE: BOARD FIDUCIARY DUTIES
10. William T. Allen. Jack B. Jacobs and Leo E. Strine. Jr. (2002). 'The
Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual
Divide' . Urtiver.sitv of Chicugo Ltttt Ret'isrr'. 69 (3). Sumtner.
1067-100 415
I l. Stephen M. Bainbridge (2006). 'Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in
Corporate Takerlvers' . Delutrure Joumal o.f'Corporate Lav'.31 (3),
t69-863 449
vii
ix
VI Lctvt and Economics o.f'Mer,e,er.s uttd At'tltti.sitiort.s I
I
I
t
t
12. Matthew D. Cain and Steven M. Davidotf (201 l). 'Form over
Substance? The Value of Corporate Process and Management BuyOuts'
, Delaw'ere Journal of Corporttte Luv'.36 (3).819-902
PART IV HOW DEALS ARE DONE: PROCESS
13. Lawrence A. Hamermesh (2002).'A Kinder, Centler Critique of
Van Gorkom and its Less Celebrated Legacies' , Northwestern
Universin' Lott' Rev,iew', 96 (2), Winter, 595-605
14. Audra L. Boone and J. Harold Mulherin (2001),'How Are Firms
Sold?' Journal ofFinance, LXII (2), April, 841-75
15. Lawrence A. Hamermesh and Michael L. Wachter (2009),
'Rationalizing Appraisal Standards in Compulsory Buyouts'.
Boston Collepe Lttw, Rey,ie1,. 50 (4), l02l_69
PART V DEFENDING THE CORPORATE BASTION: PROTECTIVE
DEVICES GENERALLY
16. Martin Lipton and Paul K. Rowe (2002),'Pills, Polls, and
Professors: A Reply to Prof-essor Gilson' , Delaware Journal of
Corporate Latt', 27 ( I ). I -35
11. Lucian Arve Bebchuk. John C. Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian
(2002),'The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards:
Theory, Evidence, and Policy', StanJord Law' Review,54 (5), May,
887-95 l
18. Brett H. McDonnell (2005), 'Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder
Nominations, and Poison Pills', Berkeley Business Law Journal,
3 (1), Fall.205-64
544
60r
6t2
641
126
t9l
Ack
I irc editt,r.
::ttilr Srr i ,
691
.r.kucll I
: F irrl. .
V0luyt r e,
Contents ,:-,.i rcier to the
: ...lc'l-ll.Of
'(-,:.S. ()r
1t'kttowledgements
\rt irttroduction hv" the editors to both t,olumes oppears in Volume I
P.\RT I RESPONDING TO A HOSTILE APPROACH
l. Guhan Subramanian (2003), 'Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover
Defenses' , Yule Low, Journal,ll3 (3), December,62l-86 3
2. Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock (2002).'How I Learned to Stop
Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law',
Universin,o.f Chicago Lttw Review,69 (3), Summer, 871-915 69
3. Bernard Black and Reinier Kraakman (2002),'Delaware's Thkeover
Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value' . Northwestern
Universitt' Law Rey,ieyt'.96 (2). Winter, 521-66 114
P{RT II PROTECTING THE DEAL
4. John C. Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian (2000), 'A Buy-Side
Model of M&A Lockups: Theory and Evidence' . Stanfrtrd Law
Revieyt',s3 (2). November,30l-96 163
5. Brian J.M. Quinn (2007). 'Bulletproof: Mandatory Rules for Deal
Protection' , Jountal of Corporation Luyt',32 (4), Summer. 865-86 253
6. Guhan Subramanian (2008), 'Go-Shops vs. No-Shops in Private
Equity Deals: Evidence and Implications' . Business Law,t'er,63 (3),
May. 129-60 215
P.{RT III TERMINATING THE DEAL
7 . Afra Afsharipour (2010), 'Transformins the Allocation of Deal Risk
Through Reverse Termination Fees' .Wtnclerbilt Latt, Ret,ievr,,
63 (5). October. 116l-210 309
8. Ronald J. Gilson and Alan Schwartz (2005), 'Understanding
MACS: Moral Hazard in Acquisitions' . Journal ,rf La*., Economics,
and Organi:otiort. 2l (2).330-58 389
P.{RT IV PRIVATE EQUITY
9. William W. Bratton (2008). 'Private Equity's Three Lessons for
Agency Theory' . Brooklyn Journal of Corporcrte Finance and
Commercial Luty.3 ( 1). Fall. l-27 421
10. Brian Cheffins and John Armour (2008). 'The Eclipse of Private
Equity' . Delatt'ure Journal of Corporctte Law,,33 ( I ), l-67 448
I l. Steven M. DavidofT (2009). 'The Failure of Privare Equiry'.
SouthernCalifomiu Lcrv' Reviex'.82(3).March.48l-545 515
vii
-r#'
Ltnr tntl Et'ortotrtit'.s o.l'Merger.s artd Accluisitions II
PART
V INTERNATIONAL ISSUES
12. John Armour and David A. Skeel, Jr. (2007 ), 'Who Writes the Rules
for Hostile Takeovers, and Why'l -The Peculiar Divergence of
U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation' , Georgetown Law Journal,
95 (6), t72l-94
13. Guido Ferrarini and Geoftrey P. Miller (2009), 'A Simple Theory of
Takeover Regulation in the United States and Europe', Cornell
Internationttl Lcrw Journal, 42 (3), 301-34
14. Christian Kirchner and Richard W. Painter (2002),'Takeover
Def'enses Under Delaware Law, the Proposed Thirteenth EU
Directive and the New German Takeover Law: Comparison and
Recommendations for Refbrm' , American Journal of Comparative
Lav,', 5O (3), Summer, 45 l-7
6
15. Paul Davies, Edmund-Philipp Schuster and Emilie Van de Walle de
Ghelcke (2010), 'The Takeover Directive as a Protectionist Tool?',
in Ulf Bernitz and Wolf'-Georg Ringe (eds), Company Law and
Economic' Protectionism: New Challenges to European Integration,
Chapter 6, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 105-60
Acr
,, i.
-
,. ..,'' '.,-:
.: -l,,it:. \:.
r-l
. . . I
' :-: :l ',,,
r-.. i r.t.
'"'-..ill
- ..... !r rr..:-
'iJi.i.ll:.
\
':':.i L:: , ,
- t\.rlle .ii.
(
: \\,,11-(,-.
' .')1 r,t'f t..,
583
651
685
ttl