Research handbook on economic models of law

Table of Contents
“Introduction”
…Thomas J. Miceli and Matthew J. Baker
“Land Assemblage: Efficiency and Equity in Public-Private Projects”
…Zachary Grossman, Jonathan Pincus, and Perry Shapiro
“The Economics of Activity Levels in Tort Liability and Regulation”
…Nuno Garoupa and Thomas S. Ulen
“Regulation versus Liability for Controlling Product-Related Risks”
…Thomas J. Miceli, Rebecca Rabon, and Kathleen Segerson
“Regulation versus Liability: A Behavioral Economics Perspective”
…Kathleen Segerson and Tsvetan Tsventanov
“Strict Liability When Victims Choose the Value of the Asset at Risk”
…Florian Baumann and Tim Friehe
“Incentives for Care, Litigation, and Tort Reform Under Self-Serving Bias”
…Claudia Landeo, Maxim Nikitin, and Sergei Izmalkov
“Tort Standards and Legal Expenditures: A Unified Model”
…Jef De Mot and Ben Depoorter
“Litigation Success Functions”
…Jef De Mot
“The Optimal Amount of Distorted Testimony When the Arbiter Can and Cannot Commit”
…Winand Emons and Claude Fluet
“Do Exclusionary Rules Convict the Innocent?”
…Dhammika Dharmapala, Nuno Garoupa, and Richard McAdams
“Search, Seizure, and False (?) Arrest: An Analysis of Fourth Amendment Remedies When
Police Can Plant Evidence”
…Dhammika Dharmapala and Thomas J. Miceli
“Crime, Expectations, and the Deterrence Hypothesis”
…Matthew J. Baker and Niklas Westelius
“Active Courts and Menu Contracts”
…Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli, and Andrew Postlewaite
“The Efficiency of Affirmative Action with Purely Historical Discrimination”
19
…Abraham Wickelgren
“The Multi-layered Action of Trademark: Meaning, Law and Market”
…Giovanni Ramello