Game thoery with economic applications

By:

Bierman H Scott

Contributor(s):

Publication details: Delhi Pearson Education Pvt. Ltd. 1998Edition: 2ndDescription: 452p xvISBN:

9780201847581

Subject(s):

1. Game Theory2. Decision Making

DDC classification:

330.010000 BIE

Contents:

Contents I. STATIC GAMES WITH COMPLETE INFORMATION. 1. Nash Equilibrium. 2. Oligopoly. 3. Strategic Trade Policy. 4. Property Rights and Efficiency. 5. Voting Games. II. DYNAMIC GAMES WITH COMPLETE INFORMATION. 6. Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. 7. Bargaining. 8. Time-Consistent Macroeconomy Policy. 9. Repeated Games and Dynamic Competition. III. GAMES WITH UNCERTAIN OUTCOMES. 10. Uncertainty and Expected Utility. 11. Moral Hazard and Incomplete Insurance. 12. Moral Hazard and Involuntary Unemployment. IV. STATIC GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION. 13. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. 14. Auctions. V. DYNAMIC GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION. 15. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. 16. Bargaining with Private Information. 17. Corporate Takeovers and Greenmail. 18. Adverse Selection and Credit Rationing. 19. Limit Pricing and Entry Deterrence. 20. Cartel Enforcement.

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Holdings
Item type	Current library	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode
BOOKs	National Law School	330.01 BIE (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Available		19751

Contents
I. STATIC GAMES WITH COMPLETE INFORMATION.
1. Nash Equilibrium.
2. Oligopoly.
3. Strategic Trade Policy.
4. Property Rights and Efficiency.
5. Voting Games. II. DYNAMIC GAMES WITH COMPLETE INFORMATION.
6. Subgame Perfect Equilibrium.
7. Bargaining.
8. Time-Consistent Macroeconomy Policy.
9. Repeated Games and Dynamic Competition. III. GAMES WITH UNCERTAIN OUTCOMES.
10. Uncertainty and Expected Utility.
11. Moral Hazard and Incomplete Insurance.
12. Moral Hazard and Involuntary Unemployment. IV. STATIC GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION.
13. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
14. Auctions. V. DYNAMIC GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION.
15. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
16. Bargaining with Private Information.
17. Corporate Takeovers and Greenmail.
18. Adverse Selection and Credit Rationing.
19. Limit Pricing and Entry Deterrence.
20. Cartel Enforcement.

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