Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy

Table of contents
Part I. Questions and Answers;
Section 1. Paths of Political Development:
1. Britain;
2. Argentina;
3. Singapore;
4. South Africa,
5. The agenda;
Section 2. Our Argument:
1. Democracy vs. nondemocracy;
2. Building blocks of our approach;
3. Towards our basic story;
4. Our theory of democratization;
5. Democratic consolidation;
6. Determinants of democracy;
7. Political identities and the nature of conflict;
8. Democracy in a picture;
9. Overview of the book; Section
3. What Do We Know About Democracy?:
1. Measuring democracy;
2. Patterns of democracy;
3. Democracy, inequality and redistribution;
4. Crises and democracy;
5. Social unrest and democratization;
6. The literature;
7. Our contribution;
Part II. Modelling Politics;
Section 4. Democratic Politics:
1. Introduction;
2. Aggregating individual preferences;
3. Single-peaked preferences and the median voter theorem;
4. Our workhorse models;
5. Democracy and political equality;
6. Conclusion; Section
5. Nondemocratic Politics:
1. Introduction;
2. Power and constraints in nondemocratic politics;
3. Modeling preferences and constraints in nondemocracies;
4. Commitment problems;
5. A simple game of promises;
6. A dynamic model;
7. Incentive compatible promises;
8. Conclusion;
Part III. The Creation and Consolidation of Democracy;
Section 6. Democratization:
1. Introduction;
2. The role of political institutions;
3. Preferences over political institutions;
4. Political power and institutions;
5. A 'static' model of democratization;
6. Democratization or repression?;
7. A dynamic model of democratization;
8. Subgame perfect equilibria;
9. Alternative political identities;
10. Targeted transfers;
11. Power of the elite in democracy;
12. Ideological preferences over regimes;
13. Democratization in pictures;
14. Equilibrium revolutions;
15. Conclusion; Section 7. Coups and Consolidation:
1. Introduction;
2. Incentives for coups;
3. A static model of coups;
4. A dynamic model of the creation and consolidation of democracy;
5. Alternative political identities;
6. Targeted transfers;
7. Power in democracy and coups;
8. Consolidation in a picture;
9. Defensive coups;
10. Conclusion;
Part IV. Putting the Models to Work;
Section 8. The Role of the Middle Class:
1. Introduction;
2. The three-class model;
3. Emergence of partial democracy;
4. From partial to full democracy;
5. Repression: the middle class as a buffer;
6. Repression: soft-liners vs. hard-liners;
7. The role of the middle class in consolidating democracy;
8. Conclusion;
Section 9. Economic Structure and Democracy:
1. Introduction;
2. Economic structure and income distribution;
3. Political conflict;
4. Capital, land and the transition to democracy;
5. Financial integration;
6. Increased political integration;
7. Alternative assumptions about the nature of international trade.
8. Conclusion;
Part V. Conclusion and The Future of Democracy;
Section 10. Conclusion and the Future of Democracy:
1. Paths of political development revisited;
2. Extension and areas for future research;
3. The future of democracy;
Part VI. Appendix;
Section 11. Appendix to Section 4: The Distribution of Power in Democracy:
1. Introduction;
2. Probabilistic voting models;
3. Lobbying;
4. Partisan politics and political capture.