The moral economy : Why good incentives are no substitute for good citizens

By:

Bowles Samuel

Contributor(s):

Publication details: London Yale University Press 2016Description: 272p xiiiISBN:

9780300163803

Subject(s):

1. Economics - Moral & Ethical Aspects2. Law & Economics

DDC classification:

330.000000 BOW

Contents:

Summary: Why do policies and business practices that ignore the moral and generous side of human nature often fail? Should the idea of economic man determine how we expect people to respond to monetary rewards, punishments and other incentives? Samuel Bowles answers with a resounding 'no'. Policies that follow from this paradigm, he shows, may crowd out ethical and generous motives and thus backfire. But incentives per se are not really the culprit. Bowles shows that crowding out occurs when the message conveyed by fines and rewards is that self-interest is expected, that the employer thinks the workforce is lazy or that the citizen cannot otherwise be trusted to contribute to the public good

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Holdings
Item type	Current library	Shelving location	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode
BOOKs	National Law School	MPP Section	330 BOW (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Available		34906

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Previous	330 BAL Rethinking economic policy for social justice : The radical potential of human rights	330 BEC The architecture of illegal markets :	330 BOW The moral economy : Why good incentives are no substitute for good citizens	330 BOW The moral economy : Why good incentives are no substitute for good citizens	330 EGE The economics of open access :	330 GUP An introduction to experimental economics	330 HAR Law and economics	Next

Summary:
Why do policies and business practices that ignore the moral and generous side of human nature often fail? Should the idea of economic man determine how we expect people to respond to monetary rewards, punishments and other incentives? Samuel Bowles answers with a resounding 'no'. Policies that follow from this paradigm, he shows, may crowd out ethical and generous motives and thus backfire. But incentives per se are not really the culprit. Bowles shows that crowding out occurs when the message conveyed by fines and rewards is that self-interest is expected, that the employer thinks the workforce is lazy or that the citizen cannot otherwise be trusted to contribute to the public good

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