The Oxford handbook of international antitrust economics Vol. I

Table of Contents:
INTRODUCTION AND INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
1. Rationales for Antitrust: Economics and Other Bases Daniel A. Crane;
2. Antitrust Enforcement Regimes: Fundamental Differences Keith N. Hylton ;
3. Economic Analysis of Antitrust Exemptions Peter Carstensen ;
4. Healthcare Provider and Payer Markets Cory S. Capps and David Dranove ;
5. International Antitrust Institutions Oliver Budzinski ;
6. Competition Policy in Public Choice Perspective Fred S. McChesney, Michael Reksulak, and William F. Shughart II ;
7. Antitrust Settlements Daniel L. Rubinfeld ;
8. The Economics of Antitrust Class Actions Roger D. Blair and Christine Piette Durrance ;
9. Behavioral Economics and Antitrust Mark Armstrong and Steffen Huck;
10. Experimental Economics in Antitrust Wieland Müller and Hans-Theo Normann ;
11. Optimal Antitrust Remedies: A Synthesis William H. Page ;
12. Private Antitrust Enforcement in the United States and the European Union: Standing and Antitrust Injury Jeffrey L. Harrison;
13. Freedom to Trade and the Competitive Process Aaron Edlin and Joseph Farrell;
II. MONOPOLY: STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS;
14. Monopoly and Dominant Firms: Antitrust Economics and Policy Approaches
Lawrence J. White;
15. Market Definition Louis Kaplow ;
16. Bilateral Monopoly: Economic Analysis and Antitrust Policy Roger D. Blair and Christina DePasquale;
17. Antitrust and the Economics of Networks Daniel F. Spulber and Christopher S. Yoo;
18. The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform Businesses David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee;
III. MERGERS
19. Efficiency Claims and Antitrust Enforcement Howard Shelanski;
20. Unilateral Effects Bryan Keating and Robert D. Willig;
21. Coordinated Effects: Evolution of Practice and Theory Jith Jayaratne and Janusz Ordover
22. Buyer Power in Merger Review Dennis W. Carlton, Mary Coleman, and Mark Israel;
23. Vertical Mergers Michael A. Salinger;