McGan Roger A  <br/><br/>
Game Theory and Public Policy 

 - 2nd 
 - London  Edward Elgar   2015 
 - 291P  viii  PB 
<br/><br/> Game Thoery  Policy Sciences 
<br/><br/>Contents: <br/>Preface <br/>PART I HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL SURVEY <br/>1. Objectives and scope of the book <br/>2. Representing games <br/>3. A brief interpretive history of game theory <br/>4. Nash equilibrium and public policy <br/>5. Correlated equilibrium <br/>6. No cooperative games in extensive form and public policy <br/>7. Social mechanism design <br/>8. Super additive games in coalition function form <br/>9. Recall, rationality and political economy <br/>PART II MIXED COOPERATIVE AND NONCOOPERATIVE DECISIONS: EXTENSIONS <br/>10. Biform games and considerable solutions <br/>11. The firm as a coalition <br/>12. What coalitions will be formed? <br/>13. Monopoly and monopsony revisited <br/>14. Bargaining and the determination of wages <br/>15. Bargaining power and majority rule References <br/>Index<br/> 
<br/><br/><label>ISBN: </label>9781788112123 
<br/><br/><label>Dewey Class. No.: </label>320.6015 MCC