Law and economics of mergers and acquisitions /
edited by Steven M. Davidoff, Associate Professor of Law and Finance, Michael E. Moritz College of Law, Ohio State University, USA and Claire A. Hill, Professor and James L. Krusemark Chair in Law, Director, Institute for Law and Rationality, University of Minnesota Law School, USA.
- 2 volumes (xvi, 1620 pages) : illustrations ; 25 cm.
- Economic approaches to law series ; 39 An Elgar research collection .
Includes bibliographical references (pages vii-viii).
Contents Acknowledgements Introduction Steven M. Davidoff and Claire A. Hill PART I BACKGROUND: HISTORY, RATIONALES AND OUTCOMES l. Henry G. Manne t 1965), 'Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control' , Journul rt'Politicul Econonry'.73 (2), April. I l0-20 3 2. Michael C. Jensen ( 1989), 'Eclipse of the Public Corporation', Han,arcl Busines.s Review.67. September-October,6l-14 14 3. Bernard S. Black ( 1989), 'Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers', Stanford Lau' Revieu'. 41 (3). February.597-660 28 4. Robert F. Bruner (2004). 'Does M&A Pay?' , rn Applied Mergers trnd Acquisitiort.s, Chapter 3. Hoboken. NJ: John Wiley and Sons. Inc., 30-65, references 92 5. Ulrike Malmendier and Geoffrey Tate (2008). 'Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market's Reaction', Joumal o.f Finunciul Ec'ortom ics. 89 (l). July, 20J3 133 PART II WHAT M&A LAWYERS DO 6. Ronald J. Gilson ( 1984). 'Valr.re Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing' , Yule Luv' Journul.94 (2). December.239-313 159 7 . Claire A. Hill (2001 ), 'Why Contracts are Written in "Legalese"'. Chic:ttgo-Kent Lutt' Reviev'.77 (1).59-85 234 8. John C. Coates IV tZOOI). 'Explaining Veiriation in Takeover Defenses: Blarne the Lawyers'. Califrtrniu Luvt' Reviev'.89 (5). 1301121 261 9. Claire A. Hill (2009). 'Bar-uaining in the Shadow of the Lawsuit: A Sociaf Norms Theory of Incomplete Contracts'. Deluttare Journal oJ'Corporctte Lov'.34. l9l-220 382 PART III HOW DEALS ARE DONE: BOARD FIDUCIARY DUTIES 10. William T. Allen. Jack B. Jacobs and Leo E. Strine. Jr. (2002). 'The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide' . Urtiver.sitv of Chicugo Ltttt Ret'isrr'. 69 (3). Sumtner. 1067-100 415 I l. Stephen M. Bainbridge (2006). 'Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takerlvers' . Delutrure Joumal o.f'Corporate Lav'.31 (3), t69-863 449 vii ix VI Lctvt and Economics o.f'Mer,e,er.s uttd At'tltti.sitiort.s I I I t t 12. Matthew D. Cain and Steven M. Davidotf (201 l). 'Form over Substance? The Value of Corporate Process and Management BuyOuts' , Delaw'ere Journal of Corporttte Luv'.36 (3).819-902 PART IV HOW DEALS ARE DONE: PROCESS 13. Lawrence A. Hamermesh (2002).'A Kinder, Centler Critique of Van Gorkom and its Less Celebrated Legacies' , Northwestern Universin' Lott' Rev,iew', 96 (2), Winter, 595-605 14. Audra L. Boone and J. Harold Mulherin (2001),'How Are Firms Sold?' Journal ofFinance, LXII (2), April, 841-75 15. Lawrence A. Hamermesh and Michael L. Wachter (2009), 'Rationalizing Appraisal Standards in Compulsory Buyouts'. Boston Collepe Lttw, Rey,ie1,. 50 (4), l02l_69 PART V DEFENDING THE CORPORATE BASTION: PROTECTIVE DEVICES GENERALLY 16. Martin Lipton and Paul K. Rowe (2002),'Pills, Polls, and Professors: A Reply to Prof-essor Gilson' , Delaware Journal of Corporate Latt', 27 ( I ). I -35 11. Lucian Arve Bebchuk. John C. Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian (2002),'The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy', StanJord Law' Review,54 (5), May, 887-95 l 18. Brett H. McDonnell (2005), 'Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison Pills', Berkeley Business Law Journal, 3 (1), Fall.205-64 544 60r 6t2 641 126 t9l Ack I irc editt,r. ::ttilr Srr i , 691 .r.kucll I : F irrl. . V0luyt r e, Contents ,:-,.i rcier to the : ...lc'l-ll.Of '(-,:.S. r 1t'kttowledgements \rt irttroduction hv" the editors to both t,olumes oppears in Volume I P.\RT I RESPONDING TO A HOSTILE APPROACH l. Guhan Subramanian (2003), 'Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses' , Yule Low, Journal,ll3 (3), December,62l-86 3 2. Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock (2002).'How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law', Universin,o.f Chicago Lttw Review,69 (3), Summer, 871-915 69 3. Bernard Black and Reinier Kraakman (2002),'Delaware's Thkeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value' . Northwestern Universitt' Law Rey,ieyt'.96 (2). Winter, 521-66 114 P{RT II PROTECTING THE DEAL 4. John C. Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian (2000), 'A Buy-Side Model of M&A Lockups: Theory and Evidence' . Stanfrtrd Law Revieyt',s3 (2). November,30l-96 163 5. Brian J.M. Quinn (2007). 'Bulletproof: Mandatory Rules for Deal Protection' , Jountal of Corporation Luyt',32 (4), Summer. 865-86 253 6. Guhan Subramanian (2008), 'Go-Shops vs. No-Shops in Private Equity Deals: Evidence and Implications' . Business Law,t'er,63 (3), May. 129-60 215 P.{RT III TERMINATING THE DEAL 7 . Afra Afsharipour (2010), 'Transformins the Allocation of Deal Risk Through Reverse Termination Fees' .Wtnclerbilt Latt, Ret,ievr,, 63 (5). October. 116l-210 309 8. Ronald J. Gilson and Alan Schwartz (2005), 'Understanding MACS: Moral Hazard in Acquisitions' . Journal ,rf La*., Economics, and Organi:otiort. 2l (2).330-58 389 P.{RT IV PRIVATE EQUITY 9. William W. Bratton (2008). 'Private Equity's Three Lessons for Agency Theory' . Brooklyn Journal of Corporcrte Finance and Commercial Luty.3 ( 1). Fall. l-27 421 10. Brian Cheffins and John Armour (2008). 'The Eclipse of Private Equity' . Delatt'ure Journal of Corporctte Law,,33 ( I ), l-67 448 I l. Steven M. DavidofT (2009). 'The Failure of Privare Equiry'. SouthernCalifomiu Lcrv' Reviex'.82(3).March.48l-545 515 vii -r#' Ltnr tntl Et'ortotrtit'.s o.l'Merger.s artd Accluisitions II PART V INTERNATIONAL ISSUES 12. John Armour and David A. Skeel, Jr. (2007 ), 'Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why'l -The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation' , Georgetown Law Journal, 95 (6), t72l-94 13. Guido Ferrarini and Geoftrey P. Miller (2009), 'A Simple Theory of Takeover Regulation in the United States and Europe', Cornell Internationttl Lcrw Journal, 42 (3), 301-34 14. Christian Kirchner and Richard W. Painter (2002),'Takeover Def'enses Under Delaware Law, the Proposed Thirteenth EU Directive and the New German Takeover Law: Comparison and Recommendations for Refbrm' , American Journal of Comparative Lav,', 5O (3), Summer, 45 l-7 6 15. Paul Davies, Edmund-Philipp Schuster and Emilie Van de Walle de Ghelcke (2010), 'The Takeover Directive as a Protectionist Tool?', in Ulf Bernitz and Wolf'-Georg Ringe (eds), Company Law and Economic' Protectionism: New Challenges to European Integration, Chapter 6, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 105-60 Acr ,, i. - ,. ..,'' '.,-: .: -l,,it:. \:. r-l . . . I ' :-: :l ',,, r-.. i r.t. '"'-..ill - ..... !r rr..:- 'iJi.i.ll:. \ ':':.i L:: , , - t\.rlle .ii. ( : \\,,11-(,-. ' .')1 r,t'f t.., 583 651 685 ttl
Consolidation and merger of corporations--Law and legislation--United States. Consolidation and merger of corporations--Economic aspects--United States.