Unelected power : The quest for legitimacy in central banking and the regulatory state / Paul Tucker.

Includes bibliographical references (pages 579-610) and index.

Table of Contents
Preface ix

1 Introduction: Power, Welfare, Incentives, Values 1

Part I Welfare: The Problem, and a Possible Solution 25

2 The Evolution of the Administrative State 27

3 The Purposes and Functional Modes of the Administrative State: Market Failure and Government Failure 48

4 The Structure of the Administrative State: A Hierarchy from Simple Agents to Trustees (and Guardians) 72

5 Principles for Whether to Delegate to Independent Agencies: Credible Commitment to Settled Goals 92

6 Design Precepts for How to Delegate to Independent Agencies 109

7 Applying the Principles for Delegation 127

Part II Values: Democratic Legitimacy for Independent Agencies 147

8 Independent Agencies and Our Political Values and Beliefs (1): Rule of Law and Constitutionalism 173

9 Independent Agencies and Our Political Values and Beliefs (2): The Challenges to Delegation-with-Insulation Presented by Democracy 195

10 Credible Commitment versus Democracy: Agencies versus Judges 221

11 The Political-Values-and-Norms Robustness Test of the Principles for Delegation 236

12 Insulated Agencies and Constitutionalism: Central Bank Independence Driven by the Separation of Powers but Not a Fourth Branch 272

Part III Incentives: The Administrative State in the Real World; Incentives and Values under Different Constitutional Structures 293

13 States' Capacity for Principled Delegation to Deliver Credible Commitment 307

14 The Problem of Vague Objectives: A Nondelegation Doctrine for IAs 334

15 Processes, Transparency, and Accountability: Legal Constraints versus Political Oversight 349

16 The Limits of Design: Power, Emergencies, and Self-Restraint 378

Part IV Power: Overmighty Citizens? The Political Economy of Central Banking; Power, Legitimacy, and Reconstruction 391

17 Central Banking and the Politics of Monetary Policy 405

18 The Shift in Ideas: Credibility as a Surprising Door to Legitimacy 414

19 Tempting the Gods: Monetary Regime Orthodoxy before the Crisis 426

20 A Money-Credit Constitution: Central Banks and Banking Stability 438

21 Central Banking and the Regulatory State: Stability Policy 461

22 Central Banking and the Fiscal State: Balance-Sheet Policy and the Fiscal Carve-Out 482

23 Central Banks and the Emergency State: Lessons from Military/Civilian Relations for the Lender of Last Resort 503

24 Overmighty Citizens After All? Threats and Reconfigurations 525

Conclusion: Unelected Democrats: Citizens in Service, Not in Charge 546

Appendix: The Principles for Delegation to Independent Agencies Insulated from Day-to-Day Politics 569

Acknowledgments 573

Bibliography 579

Index 611

Central bankers have emerged from the financial crisis as the third great pillar of unelected power alongside the judiciary and the military. They pull the regulatory and financial levers of our economic well-being, yet unlike democratically elected leaders, their power does not come directly from the people. Unelected Power lays out the principles needed to ensure that central bankers, technocrats, regulators, and other agents of the administrative state remain stewards of the common good and do not become overmighty citizens. Paul Tucker draws on a wealth of personal experience from his many years in domestic and international policymaking to tackle the big issues raised by unelected power, and enriches his discussion with examples from the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and the European Union. Blending economics, political theory, and public law, Tucker explores the necessary conditions for delegated but politically insulated power to be legitimate in the eyes of constitutional democracy and the rule of law. He explains why the solution must fit with how real-world government is structured, and why technocrats and their political overseers need incentives to make the system work as intended. Tucker explains how the regulatory state need not be a fourth branch of government free to steer by its own lights, and how central bankers can emulate the best of judicial self-restraint and become models of dispersed power.-- Provided by Publisher.