000 01562nam a2200313 a 4500
999 _c115725
_d115725
001 3915579
003 OSt
005 20200921221716.0
008 910918s1992 nyua b 001 0 eng
010 _a 91196790
020 _a9780745002330
040 _aDLC
_cDLC
050 0 0 _aHB846.8
_b.D86 1992
082 0 0 _a320.019 DUN
_220
100 1 _aDunleavy, Patrick.
245 1 0 _aDemocracy, bureaucracy, and public choice :
_bEconomic explanations in political science /
_cPatrick Dunleavy.
260 _aNew York :
_bPrentice Hall,
_c1992.
300 _axiii, 286 p. :
_bill. ;
_c23 cm.
500 _aCover title: Democracy, bureaucracy & public choice.
504 _aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 260-277) and indexes.
505 _aTable of contents Introduction: Institutional Public Choice Theory and Political Analysis DEMOCRACY Interest Groups and Collective Action Reconstructing the Theory of Groups Economic Explanations of Voting Behaviour Party Competition - The Preference-Shaping Model BUREAUCRACY Existing Public Choice Models of Bureaucracy The Bureau-Shaping Model Comparing Budget - Maximizing and Bureau-Shaping Models Conclusion - Economic Explanations in Political Science
650 0 _aSocial choice.
650 0 _aBureaucracy.
650 0 _aDemocracy.
740 0 _aDemocracy, bureaucracy & public choice.
906 _a7
_bcbc
_corignew
_d2
_encip
_f19
_gy-gencatlg
942 _2ddc
_cBK