000			01441nam a2200217Ia 4500
999			_c40546 _d40546
003			OSt
005			20201209164852.0
008			160316s2002 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020			_a9780691099897
040			_cnls
082			_a320.300000 _bTSE
100			_aTsebelis George
245			_aVeto players : How political institutions work
260			_aNew York _bRussell Sage Publications _c2002
300			_a317p _cxiii
365			_b Rs. 2,761
505			_aTable of contents; List of Figures ix; List of Tables xi ; Preface and Acknowledgments xiii ; Introduction 1; PART I: VETO PLAYERS THEORY 17 One: Individual Veto Players 19 Two: Collective Veto Players 38; PART II: VETO PLAYERS AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 65 Three:; Regimes: Nondemocratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary 67 Four: Governments and Parliaments 91 Five: Referendums 116 Six: Federalism, Bicameralism, and Qualified Majorities 136; PART III: POLICY EFFECTS OF VETO PLAYERS; 161 Seven: Legislation; 165 Eight: Macroeconomic Policies 187; PART IV: SYSTEMIC EFFECTS OF VETO PLAYERS 207 Nine: Government Stability 209 Ten: Judiciary and Bureaucracies 222 Eleven:; Veto Players Analysis of European Union Institutions; 248; Conclusion; 283; Bibliography 291; Index 309
650			_a1. Political Planning - Legislation2. Political Science - Decision Making3. Comparative Government
700			_a _a
942			_2ddc _cBK