Contents:
Preface xi
Introduction: Understanding Strategic Behavior 1;
Bibliographic Notes 4;
1. Simultaneous Decisionmaking and the Normal Form Game 6;
The Normal Form Game;
Using Different Games to Compare Legal Regimes;
The Nash Equilibrium;
Civil Liability, Accident Law, and Strategic Behavior;
Legal Rules and the Idea of Strict Dominance;
Collective Action Problems and the Two-by-Two Game;
The Problem of Multiple Nash Equilibria;
Summary;
Bibliographic Notes;
2. Dynamic Interaction and the Extensive Form Game 50
The Extensive Form Game and Backwards Induction;
A Dynamic Model of Preemption and Strategic Commitment;
Subgame Perfection;
Summary;
Bibliographic Notes;
3. Information Revelation, Disclosure Laws, and Renegotiation;
Incorporating Beliefs into the Solution Concept;
The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Solution Concept;
Verifiable Information, Voluntary Disclosure, and the Unraveling Result;
Disclosure Laws and the Limits of Unraveling;
Observable Information, Norms, and the Problem of Renegotiation;
Optimal Incentives and the Need for Renegotiation;
Limiting the Ability of Parties to Renegotiate;
Summary;
Bibliographic Notes;
4. Signaling, Screening, and Nonverifiable Information 122;
Signaling and Screening;
Modeling Nonverifiable Information;
Signals and the Effects of Legal Rules;
Information Revelation and Contract Default Rules;
Screening and the Role of Legal Rules;
Summary;
Bibliographic Notes;
5. Reputation and Repeated Games 159;
Backwards Induction and Its Limits;
Infinitely Repeated Games, Tacit Collusion, and Folk Theorems;
Reputation, Predation, and Cooperation;
Summary;
Bibliographic Notes;
6. Collective Action, Embedded Games, and the Limits of Simple Models 188;
Collective Action and the Role of Law;
Embedded Games;
Understanding the Structure of Large Games;
Collective Action and Private Information;
Collective Action Problems in Sequential Decisionmaking;
Herd Behavior;
Summary;
Bibliographic Notes;
7. Noncooperative Bargaining 219;
Modeling the Division of Gains from Trade;
Legal Rules as Exit Options;
Bargaining and Corporate Reorganizations;
Collective Bargaining and Exit Options;
Summary;
Bibliographic Notes;
8. Bargaining and Information 244;
Basic Models of the Litigation Process;
Modeling Separate Trials for Liability and Damages;
Information and Selection Bias;
Discovery Rules and Verifiable Information;
Summary;
Bibliographic Notes;
Conclusion: Information and the Limits of Law 268;
Notes 275;
References 289;
Glossary 301;
Index 319.