Table of contents
Acknowledgements;
Introduction Eric A. Posner;

PART I COMPLIANCE;
1. Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner (1999), 'A Theory of Customary International Law';
2. Andrew T. Guzman (2002), 'A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law';

PART II TREATIES;
3. Oona A. Hathaway (2002), 'Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?';
4. Francesco Parisi and Catherine Sevcenko (2003), 'Treaty Reservations and the Economics of Article 21(1) of the Vienna Convention';
5. Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman and Beth A. Simmons (2006), 'Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000';

PART III INSTITUTIONS;
6. Kenneth W. Abbott, Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter and Duncan Snidal (2000), 'The Concept of Legalization';
7. Andrew T. Guzman (2002), 'The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to Interstate Dispute Resolution Mechanisms';
8. Eric A. Posner and John C. Yoo (2005), 'Judicial Independence in International Tribunals';
9. Giovanni Maggi and Massimo Morelli (2006), 'Self-Enforcing Voting in International Organizations';
10. Alan O. Sykes (2005), 'Public versus Private Enforcement of International Economic Law: Standing and Remedy';
11. Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes (2007), 'An Economic Analysis of State and Individual Responsibility Under International Law';

PART IV SECURITY;
12. Jonathan Eaton and Maxim Engers (1992), 'Sanctions';
13. Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley (2001), 'Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action';
14. Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes (2005), 'Optimal War and Jus ad Bellum'