Library Catalogue
The economics of information :
Molho, Ian.
The economics of information : lying and cheating in markets and organizations / Ian Molho. - Oxford ; Malden, Mass. : Blackwell, 1997. - x, 262 p. : ill. ; 23 cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Introduction: Private Information and Hidden Action.
Part I: Adverse Selection: The Market for Lemons. .
2. Quality Uncertainty and the Market for Lemons.
3. Adverse Selection: The Wilson Model.
4. Lemons Problems: Experimental Evidence.
Part II: Signalling.
5. Job Market Signalling.
6. Screening: A Self-Selection Mechanism.
7. Further Literature on Signalling Theory.
8. Signalling/Screening Behaviour: Experimental Evidence.
Part III: Moral Hazard.
9. Moral Hazard: Shareholder/Management Relations.
10. Moral Hazard: A Principal-Agent Model.
11. Further Literature on Moral Hazard and Agency Theory.
12. Moral Hazard: Experimental Evidence.
Part IV: Mechanism Design: Applications to Bargaining and Auctions. .
13. Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principle: A Bargaining Example.
14. Auction Design: Theory.
15. Auction Design: Experimental Evidence.
16. Concluding Comments.
Appendix: Brief Notes on Probability Distributions, Baye's Rule, Expected Utility Theory and Game Theory.
Index.
0631201521 (alk. paper) 0631206663 (pbk. : alk. paper)
97002335
Information theory in economics.
Uncertainty.
Decision making.
HB133 / .M65 1997
306.4/2
The economics of information : lying and cheating in markets and organizations / Ian Molho. - Oxford ; Malden, Mass. : Blackwell, 1997. - x, 262 p. : ill. ; 23 cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Introduction: Private Information and Hidden Action.
Part I: Adverse Selection: The Market for Lemons. .
2. Quality Uncertainty and the Market for Lemons.
3. Adverse Selection: The Wilson Model.
4. Lemons Problems: Experimental Evidence.
Part II: Signalling.
5. Job Market Signalling.
6. Screening: A Self-Selection Mechanism.
7. Further Literature on Signalling Theory.
8. Signalling/Screening Behaviour: Experimental Evidence.
Part III: Moral Hazard.
9. Moral Hazard: Shareholder/Management Relations.
10. Moral Hazard: A Principal-Agent Model.
11. Further Literature on Moral Hazard and Agency Theory.
12. Moral Hazard: Experimental Evidence.
Part IV: Mechanism Design: Applications to Bargaining and Auctions. .
13. Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principle: A Bargaining Example.
14. Auction Design: Theory.
15. Auction Design: Experimental Evidence.
16. Concluding Comments.
Appendix: Brief Notes on Probability Distributions, Baye's Rule, Expected Utility Theory and Game Theory.
Index.
0631201521 (alk. paper) 0631206663 (pbk. : alk. paper)
97002335
Information theory in economics.
Uncertainty.
Decision making.
HB133 / .M65 1997
306.4/2