Normal view MARC view ISBD view

Phlips Louis

Applied industrial economics - Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1998 - 443p xi

Table of Contents
Preface;
Introduction;
Part I. Market Structure:
1. Game theory and industry studies: an introductory overview John Sutton;
2. Game-theoretic models of market concentration: sunk costs and market structure - a review article Richard Schmalensee;
3. Expanding markets: capacity expansion in the titanium dioxide industry Pankaj Ghemawat;
4. Declining markets: the devolution of declining industries Pankaj Ghemawat and Barry Nalebuff;
5. Empirical evidence: exit from declining industries - 'shakeout' or 'stakeout'? Marvin B. Lieberman;
Part II. Industrial Pricing and Pricing Schemes:
6. Intertemporal pricing schemes: experimental tests of consciously parallel behaviour in oligopoly Ronald Harstad, Stephen Martin and Hans-Theo Normann;
7. Spatial pricing schemes: on the strategic choice of spatial price policy Jacques-François Thisse and Xavier Vives;
8. Best-price policies: facilitating practices - the effects of advance notice and best-price policies Charles A. Holt and David T. Scheffman;
9. Vertical pricing schemes: vertical restraints and producers' competition Patrick Rey and Joseph Stiglitz;
10. Price discrimination in a common market: international price discrimination in the European car market Frank Verboven;
11. Tacit collusion (I): interfirm rivalry in a repeated game - an empirical test of tacit collusion Margaret E. Slade;
12. Tacit collusion (II): collusive equilibrium in the great salt duopoly Ray Rees;
Part III. Competition Policy:
13. Collusion and predation: on the detection of collusion and predation Louis Phlips;
14. Vertical restraints: vertical restraints in European competition policy J. A. Kay;
15. Franchising agreements: economic assessment of competition law provisions applicable to franchising OECD;
16. Joint R&D ventures: cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers C. d'Aspremont and A. Jacquemin;
Part IV. Mergers and Merger Control:
17. Unprofitable exogenous mergers: losses from horizontal merger - the effects of an exogenous change in industry structure on Cournot-Nash equilibrium S. W. Salant, S. Switzer and R. J. Reynolds;
18. Profitable horizontal mergers and welfare: horizontal mergers - an equilibrium analysis Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro;
19. Using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index: horizontal mergers - comment Gregory J. Werden;
20. Cournot and merger control: horizontal mergers - reply Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro;
21.Vertical mergers: vertical mergers in multi-product industries and Edgeworth's paradox of taxation Michael A. Salinger;
22. Enforcement of the US merger guidelines: empirical evidence on FTC enforcement of the merger guidelines Malcolm B. Coate and Fred S. McChesney;
23. Enforcement of the European merger regulation: the merger decisions of the European Commission Damien Neven, Robin Nuttall and Paul Seabright;
Index.

ISBN: 9780521629546

Subjects--Topical Terms:
1. Industrial Organisation - Economic Theory

Dewey Class. No.: 338.500000 / PHL