
Library Catalogue

| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 04025nam a2200217Ia 4500 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER | |
| control field | OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20210906121158.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 160316s1999 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER | |
| International Standard Book Number | 0521659787 |
| 040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE | |
| Transcribing agency | n |
| 082 ## - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER | |
| Classification number | 338.5 SPU |
| Item number | SPU |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Spulber Daniel F |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Market microstructure : Intermediaries and the theory of the firm |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Place of publication, distribution, etc. | Cambridge |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc. | Cambridge University Press |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 1999 |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION | |
| Extent | 374p |
| Dimensions | xxix |
| 365 ## - TRADE PRICE | |
| Price amount | Rs.977.50 |
| 505 ## - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE | |
| Formatted contents note | <br/>Contents;<br/>Preface and acknowledgments;<br/>Introduction;<br/>Part I: Market microstructure and the intermediation theory of the firm;<br/>1 Market microstructure and intermediation;<br/> 1.1 Who decides?<br/> 1.2 The circular flow of economic activity;<br/> 1.3 Comparison with other economic theories of the firm;<br/> 1.4 Intermediation in the U.S. economy;<br/> 1.5 Conclusion;<br/> 2 Price setting and intermediation by firms;<br/> 2.1 Price setting by intermediaries;<br/> 2.2 Allocation under uncertainty and over time;<br/> 2.3 Price adjustment by intermediaries;<br/> 2.4 Inventories and market clearing by intermediaries;<br/> 2.5 Conclusion;<br/>Part II: Competition and market equilibrium;<br/>3 Competition between intermediaries;<br/> 3.1 Bertrand competition for inputs with homogeneous products;<br/> 3.2 Bertrand price competition with differentiated products and purchases;<br/> 3.3 Bertrand competition with switching costs;<br/> 3.4 Bertrand competition when costs differ;<br/> 3.5 Conclusion;<br/>4 Intermediation and general equilibrium;<br/> 4.1 The neoclassical theory of the firm;<br/> 4.2 Transaction costs and Walrasian equilibrium;<br/> 4.3 Monopoly intermediation in general equilibrium;<br/> 4.4 Monopolistic competition;<br/> 4.5 Conclusion;<br/>Appendix;<br/>Part III: Intermediation versus decentralized trade;<br/>5 Matching and intermediation by firms;<br/> 5.1 Intermediation versus a matching market;<br/> 5.2 Costly intermediation;<br/> 5.3 Intermediation with random matching;<br/> 5.4 Intermediation and matching with production;<br/> 5.5 Conclusion;<br/> 6 Search and intermediation by firms;<br/> 6.1 The market model;<br/> 6.2 Market equilibrium;<br/> 6.3 Comparison with Walrasian equilibrium and with monopoly;<br/> 6.4 Market equilibrium with continual entry of consumers and suppliers;<br/> 6.5 Conclusion;<br/>Appendix;<br/>Part IV: Intermediation under asymmetric information;<br/>7 Adverse selection in product markets;<br/> 7.1 Intermediated trade;<br/> 7.2 Intermediated trade with production;<br/> 7.3 Market clearing by intermediaries;<br/> 7.4 Product quality and guaranties by experts;<br/> 7.5 Conclusion;<br/>Appendix;<br/>8 Adverse selection in financial markets;<br/> 8.1 Insiders, liquidity traders, and specialists;<br/> 8.2 Competition between specialists;<br/> 8.3 Informed intermediaries;<br/> 8.4 Credit rationing by financial intermediaries;<br/> 8.5 Conclusion;<br/>Part V: Intermediation and transaction-cost theory;<br/>9. Transaction costs and the contractual theory of the firm;<br/> 9.1 Transaction costs versus management costs;<br/> 9.2 Transaction costs, uncertainty, and bounded rationality;<br/> 9.3 Transaction costs and opportunism;<br/> 9.4 Transaction costs and ownership;<br/> 9.5 Conclusion;<br/>10 Transaction costs and the intermediation theory of the firm;<br/> 10.1 Transaction costs and market microstructure;<br/> 10.2 Intermediation and vertical integration;<br/> 10.3 Intermediation and opportunism;<br/> 10.4 Intermediation and ownership;<br/> 10.5 Conclusion;<br/>Part VI: Intermediation and agency theory;<br/>II Agency and the organizational-incentive theory of the firm;<br/>11.1 Vertical integration and the boundaries of the firm;<br/> 11.2 Coordination of agents by the firm;<br/> 11.3 Delegation of authority by owners to managers;<br/> 11.4 Delegation of authority by managers to employees;<br/> 11.5 Conclusion;<br/> 12 Agency and the intermediation theory of the firm;<br/> 12.1 What is an agent?<br/> 12.2 Delegated bargaining;<br/> 12.3 Delegated competition;<br/> 12.4 Delegated monitoring;<br/> 12.5 Conclusion;<br/>Conclusion;<br/>References;<br/>Index;<br/> |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM | |
| Topical term or geographic name entry element | 1. Industrial organizatin - Economic Theory2. Microeconomics3. Stock Exchanges |
| 700 ## - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | |
| -- | |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Source of classification or shelving scheme | Dewey Decimal Classification |
| Koha item type | BOOKs |
| Withdrawn status | Lost status | Damaged status | Not for loan | Home library | Current library | Shelving location | Date acquired | Cost, normal purchase price | Total Checkouts | Full call number | Barcode | Date last seen | Price effective from | Koha item type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NLS | NLS | Library Compactors | 30/05/2017 | 977.50 | 338.5 SPU | 15413 | 30/05/2017 | 30/05/2017 | BOOKs |