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Game theory for applied economists / (Record no. 24551)

MARC details
000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 03510pam a2200325 a 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 613706
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20210419152800.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 920122s1992 njua b 001 0 eng
010 ## - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONTROL NUMBER
LC control number 92002788
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number 0691043086 (CL) :
Terms of availability $45.00
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number 0691003955 (PB) :
Terms of availability $19.95
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE
Original cataloging agency DLC
Transcribing agency DLC
Modifying agency DLC
050 00 - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER
Classification number HB144
Item number .G49 1992
082 00 - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER
Classification number 330.01 GIB
Edition number 20
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Gibbons, Robert,
Dates associated with a name 1958-
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Game theory for applied economists /
Statement of responsibility, etc. Robert Gibbons.
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. Princeton, N.J. :
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Princeton University Press,
Date of publication, distribution, etc. c1992.
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent xiii, 267 p. :
Other physical details ill. ;
Dimensions 25 cm.
504 ## - BIBLIOGRAPHY, ETC. NOTE
Bibliography, etc. note Includes bibliographical references and index.
505 ## - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note Contents: <br/>1. Static Games of Complete Information;<br/>1.1 Basic Theory: Narmal-Form Games and Nash Equilibrium;<br/>1.1.A Normal-Form Representation of Games;<br/>1.1.B Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies;<br/>1.1.C Motivation and Definition of Nash Equilibriuin;<br/>1.2 Applications;<br/>1.2.A Cournot Model of Duopoly;<br/>1.2.B Bertrand Model of Duopoly;<br/>1.2.C Final-Offer Arbitration;<br/>1.2.D The Problem of the Commons;<br/>1.3 Advanced Theory: Mixed Strategies and Existence of Equilibrium;<br/>1.3.A Mixed Strategies;<br/>1.3.B Existence of Nash Equilibrium;<br/>2 Dynamic Games of Complete Information;<br/>2.1 Dynamic Games of Complete and Perfect Information;<br/>2.1.A Theory: Backwards Induction;<br/>2.1.B Stackelberg Model of Duopoly;<br/>2.1.C Wages and Employment in a Unionized Firm;<br/>2.1.D Sequential Bargaining;<br/>2.2 Two-Stage Games of Complete but Imperfect Information;<br/>2.2.A Theory: Subgame Perfection;<br/>2.2.B Bank Runs;<br/>2.2.C Tariffs and Imperfect International Competition;<br/>2.2.D Tournaments;<br/>2.3 Repeated Games;<br/>2.3.A Theory: Two-Stage Repeated Games;<br/>2.3.B Theory: Infinitely Repeated Games;<br/>2.3.C Collusion between Cournot Duopolists;<br/>2.3.D Efficiency Wages;<br/>2.3.E Time-Consistent Monetary Policy;<br/>2.4 Dynamic Games of Complete but Imperfect Information;<br/>2.4.A Extensive-Form Representation of Games;<br/>2.4.B Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibriuin;<br/>3 Static Games of Incomplete Information;<br/>3.1 Theory: Static Bayesian Ganies and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium;<br/>3.1.A An Example: Cournot Competition under Asymmetric Information;<br/>3.1.B Normal-Form Representation of Static Bayesian Games;<br/>3.1.C Definition of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium;<br/>3.2 Applications;<br/>3.2.A Mixed Strategies Revisited;<br/>3.2.B An Auction;<br/>3.2.C A Double Auction;<br/>3.3 The Revelation Principle;<br/>4 Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information;<br/>4.1 Introduction to Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium;<br/>4.2 Signaling Games;<br/>4.2.A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Signaling Games;<br/>4.2.B Job-Market Signaling;<br/>4.2.C Corporate Investment and Capital Structure;<br/>4.2.D Monetary Policy;<br/>4.3 Other Applications of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium;<br/>4.3.A Cheap-Talk Games;<br/>4.3.B Sequential Bargaining under Asymmetric Information;<br/>4.3.C Reputation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemnia;<br/>4.4 Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium;<br/>Index.
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Game theory.
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Economics, Mathematical.
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Economics
General subdivision Mathematical models.
856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Materials specified Table of contents
Uniform Resource Identifier <a href="http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/prin031/92002788.html">http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/prin031/92002788.html</a>
856 42 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Materials specified Publisher description
Uniform Resource Identifier <a href="http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/prin021/92002788.html">http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/prin021/92002788.html</a>
906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN)
a 7
b cbc
c orignew
d 1
e ocip
f 19
g y-gencatlg
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Source of classification or shelving scheme Dewey Decimal Classification
Koha item type BOOKs
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Home library Current library Shelving location Date acquired Cost, normal purchase price Total Checkouts Full call number Barcode Date last seen Price effective from Koha item type
    Dewey Decimal Classification     . . General Stacks 30.05.2017 2821.00   330.01 GIB 22059 14.06.2024 30.05.2017 BOOKs