Includes bibliographical references (pages 365-374) and index.

Table of Contents
Acknowledgments
Illustrations
Introduction
Part I: When are Thinking like an Economist and Thinking like a Lawyer Consistent?;
Chapter 1: Pareto Efficiency and Kaldor-Hicks Criterion Compared;
Chapter 2: Rational Economic Behavior and Logic Defined;
Chapter 3: Judicial Use of Economic Rationality (Efficiency);
Chapter 4: Equal Protection and Lexical Constraints on Efficiency;
Chapter 5: Legal Rationality and Logic Defined;
Chapter 6: When are Law and Economics Consistent (Isomorphic)?;
Part II: Providing Infrastructure and Controlling Externalities Requires Resolving Conflicts between Individual Self-Interest and Cooperation;
Chapter 7: Prisoners’ Dilemma and Introduction to Game Theory ;
Chapter 8: Market and Government Failures as Prisoners’ Dilemmas;
Chapter 9: Five Requirements for Competitive Markets ;
Chapter 10: In the Long Run We Are All Dead;
Part III: General Case vs. Hard Case Methodologies: Rottenberg, Coase, Calabresi, and Posner;
Chapter 11: Rottenberg’s Theorem: Effect of a Change in Property Rights on Free Markets;
Chapter 12: Coase’s Theorems: Effect of Property Rights and Liability Rules on Mutually Interfering Activities;
Chapter 13: Calabresi’s Criteria for Allocating Accident Costs Common to Several Activities ;
Chapter 14: Posner’s Economic Analysis of the Common Law;
Part IV: Risk, Insurance, and Incomplete Information ;
Chapter 15: Risk, Insurance, Judge Hand Test, and Value of a Statistical Life;
Chapter 16: Incomplete Information: Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, and Principal-Agent Problem;
Part V: Law and Economics of Civil Obligation;
Chapter 17: Game Theoretic Framework for Law and Economics of Civil Obligation;
Chapter 18: Torts: Negligence and Products Liability;
Chapter 19: Strict Rules, Competitive Market Contract Model;
Chapter 20: Discretionary Standards, Imperfect Competition Contract Model ;
Chapter 21: Decision Theory, Suit, and Settlement;
Bibliography;
About the Author