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Collected papers in theoretical economics / Kaushik Basu.

By: Publication details: New Delhi : Oxford University Press, c2005-<2010>Description: 217pages, vi 25 cmISBN:
  • 9780195667622
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 330.01 BAS 22
LOC classification:
  • HD75 .B375 2005
Online resources:
Incomplete contents:
Contents: 1. Introduction: Part I. Rationality and Social Norms: 2. The Traveller s Dilemma: Paradoxes of Rationality in Game Theory; 3. On Why We Do Not Try to Walk Off Without Paying After a Taxi Ride; Part II. Games and Equilibrium Behaviour: 4. On the Existence of a Rationality Definition for Extensive Games; 5. Strategy Subsets Closed under Rational Behaviour; 6. Group Rationality, Utilitarianism, and Escher’s Waterfall; 7. Information and Strategy in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma; Part III. Industrial Organization and Strategic Behaviour: 8. Monopoly, Quality Uncertainty, and Status Goods; 9. Why Monopolists Prefer to Make Their Goods Less Durable; 10. Entry-Deterrence in Stackelberg Perfect Equilibria; 11. Collusion in Finitely Repeated Oligopolies; 12. Stackelberg Equilibrium in Oligopoly: An Explanation based on Managerial Incentives; 13. The Strategic Role of International Credit as an Instrument of Trade; 14. Why Are So Many Goods Priced to End in Nine? And Why This Practice Hurts the Producers; Part IV. Government, Games and The Law: 15. Notes on Bribery and the Control of Corruption; A Model of Monopoly with Strategic Government Intervention; 17. On Misunderstanding Government: An Analysis of the Art of Policy Advice; 18. The Economics and Law of Tenancy Rent Control;
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Includes bibliographical references and indexes.

Contents:
1. Introduction:
Part I. Rationality and Social Norms:
2. The Traveller s Dilemma: Paradoxes of Rationality in Game Theory;
3. On Why We Do Not Try to Walk Off Without Paying After a Taxi Ride;
Part II. Games and Equilibrium Behaviour:
4. On the Existence of a Rationality Definition for Extensive Games;
5. Strategy Subsets Closed under Rational Behaviour;
6. Group Rationality, Utilitarianism, and Escher’s Waterfall;
7. Information and Strategy in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma;
Part III. Industrial Organization and Strategic Behaviour:
8. Monopoly, Quality Uncertainty, and Status Goods;
9. Why Monopolists Prefer to Make Their Goods Less Durable;
10. Entry-Deterrence in Stackelberg Perfect Equilibria;
11. Collusion in Finitely Repeated Oligopolies;
12. Stackelberg Equilibrium in Oligopoly: An Explanation based on Managerial Incentives;
13. The Strategic Role of International Credit as an Instrument of Trade;
14. Why Are So Many Goods Priced to End in Nine? And Why This Practice Hurts
the Producers;
Part IV. Government, Games and The Law:
15. Notes on Bribery and the Control of Corruption;
A Model of Monopoly with Strategic Government Intervention;
17. On Misunderstanding Government: An Analysis of the Art of Policy Advice;
18. The Economics and Law of Tenancy Rent Control;