Includes bibliographical references and index.

Contents:
1. Static Games of Complete Information;
1.1 Basic Theory: Narmal-Form Games and Nash Equilibrium;
1.1.A Normal-Form Representation of Games;
1.1.B Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies;
1.1.C Motivation and Definition of Nash Equilibriuin;
1.2 Applications;
1.2.A Cournot Model of Duopoly;
1.2.B Bertrand Model of Duopoly;
1.2.C Final-Offer Arbitration;
1.2.D The Problem of the Commons;
1.3 Advanced Theory: Mixed Strategies and Existence of Equilibrium;
1.3.A Mixed Strategies;
1.3.B Existence of Nash Equilibrium;
2 Dynamic Games of Complete Information;
2.1 Dynamic Games of Complete and Perfect Information;
2.1.A Theory: Backwards Induction;
2.1.B Stackelberg Model of Duopoly;
2.1.C Wages and Employment in a Unionized Firm;
2.1.D Sequential Bargaining;
2.2 Two-Stage Games of Complete but Imperfect Information;
2.2.A Theory: Subgame Perfection;
2.2.B Bank Runs;
2.2.C Tariffs and Imperfect International Competition;
2.2.D Tournaments;
2.3 Repeated Games;
2.3.A Theory: Two-Stage Repeated Games;
2.3.B Theory: Infinitely Repeated Games;
2.3.C Collusion between Cournot Duopolists;
2.3.D Efficiency Wages;
2.3.E Time-Consistent Monetary Policy;
2.4 Dynamic Games of Complete but Imperfect Information;
2.4.A Extensive-Form Representation of Games;
2.4.B Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibriuin;
3 Static Games of Incomplete Information;
3.1 Theory: Static Bayesian Ganies and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium;
3.1.A An Example: Cournot Competition under Asymmetric Information;
3.1.B Normal-Form Representation of Static Bayesian Games;
3.1.C Definition of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium;
3.2 Applications;
3.2.A Mixed Strategies Revisited;
3.2.B An Auction;
3.2.C A Double Auction;
3.3 The Revelation Principle;
4 Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information;
4.1 Introduction to Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium;
4.2 Signaling Games;
4.2.A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Signaling Games;
4.2.B Job-Market Signaling;
4.2.C Corporate Investment and Capital Structure;
4.2.D Monetary Policy;
4.3 Other Applications of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium;
4.3.A Cheap-Talk Games;
4.3.B Sequential Bargaining under Asymmetric Information;
4.3.C Reputation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemnia;
4.4 Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium;
Index.