Table of contents 1. INTRODUCTION; 2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY; 3. CHAPTER 1 A SHORT SUMMARY OF DEBT CRISES FROM 1970-2002; 1.1 Overall Data; 1.2 Three Decades of Country Crises; 1.2.1 Period of 1980s: Repetitive Moratoria and Bank Debt Reschedulings; 1.2.1.1 Role of London Club; 1.2.2 Early 1990s: Securitization and Reduction of Debt through the Brady Plan; 1.2.2.1 Brady Plan; 1.2.3 1990s to Present: (Ad Hoc Responses to Crisis-Examples of Mexico 1994, Korea 1997, Russia 1998, Ecuador 1999, Turkey 2001, Argentina 2001 and Brazil 2002; 1.2.3.1 Mexican Foreign Exchange Crisis of 1994; 1.2.3.2 Asian Crisis of 1997: The South Korea Example; 1.2.3.3 The Russian Crisis of 1998: The Default Solution; 1.2.3.4 Ecuador 1999: Bond Restructuring with Exit Amendments; 1.2.3.5 Turkey 2001: Foreign and Domestic Debt; 1.2.3.6 Argentina 2001: A Step into the Unknown; 1.2.3.7 Brazil 2002: More IMF Lending; 4. CHAPTER 2 REASONS FOR THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS; 2.1 Understanding the problem of Sovereign Debt crises; 2.2 Sovereign Debt Vs. Corporate Debt; 2.3 Major problem with Sovereign Debt; 2.4 Recent complexities in the issue of Sovereign Debt; 2.4.1 Difficulty in restructuring bonds; 2.4.2 Creditor Heterogeneity and the Divergence of Interests; 2.4.3 Problem of 'Holdout Creditors'; 2.4.4 Problem of financing during restructuring; 5. CHAPTER 3 SOVEREIGNS DEBT RESTRUCTURING PROCEDURES: A HISTORY OF IDEAS; 3.1 Proposal of Group of 77 developing countries, Arusha, 1979; 3.2 Christopher Oechsli Proposal (1981); 3.3 Jeffrey Sachs's influential 1984 Princeton Study, "Theoretical Issues in International Borrowing"; 3.4 Proposals on Debt overhang problem and "market-based" debt reduction schemes(Mid 1980's); 3.5 IMF Lending into Arrears Policy: Initiatives Within the Existing Statutory Framework (Late 1980's); 3.6 Debevoise proposal (1984); 3.7 Statutory Proposals; 3.7.1 Proposals by Barnett, Galvis, and Gouraige (1984); 3.7.2 Benjamin Cohen (1989); 3.7.3 Brett Miller Proposal (1991) and Williamson (1992) Proposal 3.7.4 Raffer's proposal (1990); 3.7.5 Daniel Kaeser's Proposal (1990); 3.8 Suggestions for a bankruptcy court; 3.8.1 Jeffrey Sachs (1995), "Do We Need an International Lender of Last Resort?" (April 20, 1995); 3.8.2 Bulow's proposal (1986); 3.8.3 John Chun' s proposal (1996); 3.9 Orderly Workouts Without a Bankruptcy Court; 3.9.1 James Hurlock's proposal (1995); 3.9.2 Proposal of Eichengreen and Portes (1995); 3.9.3 Rory Macmillan's proposal (1995); 3.9.4 Report of the G-10 Deputies Working Group, written in response to the Halifax summit's(1996); 3.10. Proposals during 2000-2001; 3.10.1 Barry Eichengreen's proposal (2000); 3.10.2 Lerrick and Meltzer's proposal (20ot); 3.10.3 Steven Schwarcz's proposal (2000); 3.10.4 Kruger's SDRM proposal (2001); 6. CHAP'fER 4 PRINCIPAL REFORM PROPOSALS; 4.1 Collective Action Clause: Market-based approach; 4.1.1 Different classes of CACs; 4.1.1.1 Majority-Amendment Clauses; 4.1.1.2 Acceleration Clause; 4.1.1.3 Engagement clause; 4.1.1.4 Initiation clause; 4.1.2 Are Majority Action Clauses the Solution? ; 4.1.3 Problem of Holdouts: Is CAC a solution to Holdouts? 4.1.4 Additional Challenges; 4.2 "Exit consents" and "Exchange offer"; 4.2.1 Exit consents in Sovereign Debt Exchanges (Ecuadorian Debt crisis); 4.2.1.1 Restructuring strategy taken by Ecuador; 4.2.2 Exit consents/Exchange offers are not the perfect solution; 4.3 IMF Proposed SDRM; 4.3.1 Important features of Proposed SDRM; 4.3.2 Critical Review of the Proposed IMF SDRM; 4.3.2.1 Present vs. future debt; 4.3.2.2 Extent of economic and financial dislocation; 4.3.2.3 Creditors' objection on sovereign expenditure; 4.3.2.4 General exclusion; 4.3.2.5 Limited choice to the sovereign- debtor; 4.3.2.6 Government accounting system; 4.3.2.7 SDDRF-Dispute resolution body; 4.3.3 Certain crucial aspects of IMF SDRM; 4.3.3.1 Identity of the debtor; 4.3.3.1.1 Central Government; 4.3.3.1.2 Public Entities; 4.3.3.2 Nature of the Claim; 4.3.3.2.1 Proposed definition of eligible claims; 4.3.3.2.2 Privileged claims; 4.3.3.2.3 Domestic debt; 4.3.3.3.3 Identity of the Creditor Holding the Claim; 4.3.3.3.1 Bilateral and Trade creditors; 4.3.3.3.2 Institutional credit and Multipartite credit; 4.3.3.4 Activation; 4.3.3.5. Consequences of Activation: Provision for information, registration and verification; 4.3.3.6 Stay on enforcement; 4.3.3.7 Valuation of claims; 4.3.3.8 Creditors' participation; 4.3.4 Issues that Remain; 7. CHAPTERS; SUGGESTIONS AND CONCLUSION; 8. BIBLIOGRAPHY