

| Item type | Current library | Status | Barcode | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Open Access Books - Publishers
|
. | Available | OABP295 |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction: Bad Options and Difficult Choices in the Eurozone Crisis -- Short Primer on the Eurozone Crisis -- Unequal Distribution of Crisis-Resolution Costs -- Bad Options, Difficult Choices -- Argument in Brief -- Plan of the Book -- Putting the Eurozone Crisis in Context: Country-Level Vulnerability Profiles -- Interest Group Vulnerability Profile and Crisis Resolution Preferences -- Crisis Politics -- Conclusion -- 2. Putting the Eurozone Crisis Experience in Perspective -- Argument: Vulnerability Profiles and Crisis Responses -- Weighing Bad Options: The Potential Costs of External and Internal Adjustment -- Relative Costs of Adjustment: Vulnerability Profiles and Policy Responses -- Research Design -- Sample Selection: Identifying Balance-of-Payment Crises -- Operationalization: Vulnerability Profiles -- How is the Euro Crisis Different? Putting the Eurozone Crisis in Context -- 1992 EMS Crisis and the Eurozone Crisis -- 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the Eurozone Crisis -- Eastern European Responses to the 2008/9 Global Financial Crisis and the Eurozone Crisis -- Crisis Dynamics: Changing Vulnerabilities in the Eurozone Crisis -- Conclusion -- Appendix -- 3. Distributive Conflict and Interest Group Preferences in Deficit Countries -- Interest Groups and Deficit Country Policymaking -- Group-Specific Adjustment Preferences in Eurozone Deficit Countries -- Interest Group Vulnerability to External Adjustment -- Interest Group Vulnerability to Internal Adjustment -- Group-Specific Vulnerability Profiles and Preferred Crisis Resolution Strategies -- Research Design -- Case Selection -- Interest Group Survey: Sampling and Design -- Structure of the Analysis -- Policy-Specific Preferences on Eurozone Crisis Management -- Preferences about Overall Crisis Management Strategies -- External Adjustment Policies -- Internal Adjustment Policies -- Financing Policies -- Vulnerability Profiles and Preferred Eurozone Crisis Management Strategies -- Vulnerability Profiles of Deficit Country Interest Groups -- Vulnerability Profiles and Evaluations of Crisis Strategies -- Choosing Among Bad Options: Preferred Crisis Management Strategies in Trade-Off Situations -- Vulnerability Profiles and Preferred Adjustment Strategies -- Conclusion: From Adjustment Preferences to Adjustment Policies -- Appendix -- 4. Crisis Politics in Deficit Countries -- Ireland in Crisis -- Policies and Conflict Lines Surrounding External Adjustment in Ireland -- Policies and Conflict Lines Surrounding Internal Adjustment in Ireland -- Policies and Conflict Lines Surrounding Financing in Ireland -- Crisis Politics in Ireland: Conclusion -- Spain in Crisis -- Policies and Conflict Lines Surrounding External Adjustment in Spain -- Policies and Conflict Lines Surrounding Internal Adjustment in Spain -- Policies and Conflict Lines Surrounding Financing in Spain -- Crisis Politics in Spain: Conclusion -- Greece in Crisis -- Policies and Conflict Lines Surrounding External Adjustment in Greece -- Policies and Conflict Lines Surrounding Internal Adjustment in Greece -- Policies and Conflict Lines Surrounding Financing in Greece -- Crisis Politics in Greece: Conclusion -- Conclusion -- Appendix -- 5. Surplus Country Vulnerability to Rebalancing: A Comparative Analysis -- Introduction -- Surplus Country Preferences and National Interests in the Eurozone Crisis -- Vulnerability Profiles -- Concept and Argument -- Weighing Bad Options: Vulnerabilities to External and Internal Adjustment -- Research Design -- Sample Selection: Identifying Surplus Countries during Balance-of-Payments Crises -- Operationalization: Vulnerability Profiles -- Creating the Cost Indexes Using PCA -- Vulnerability Profiles of Surplus Countries in the Eurozone Crisis -- Vulnerability Profiles of Non-Eurozone Surplus Countries during the Eurozone Crisis -- Vulnerability Profiles of Surplus Countries in the 1992/3 EMS Crisis -- Conclusion -- 6. Distributive Conflict and Interest Group Preferences in Surplus Countries -- Domestic Trade-Offs, Vulnerability Profiles, and Adjustment in Surplus Countries -- Research Design: Studying Interest Group Preferences in Surplus Countries -- Policy-Specific Preferences on Eurozone Crisis Management -- External Adjustment Preferences -- Internal Adjustment Preferences -- Financing Preferences -- Material Interests and Policy Preferences -- Policy Salience -- Trade-Offs and Difficult Choices between External Adjustment, Internal Adjustment, and Financing -- Vulnerability Profiles and Preferred Crisis Responses -- Conclusion -- 7. Crisis Politics in Surplus Countries: Caught between Voter Pressure and Interest Group Stalemate -- Voter Preferences about How to Resolve the Eurozone Crisis -- External Adjustment: Surplus Country Voters and a Breakup of the Eurozone -- Internal Adjustment: Public Opinion on Domestic Rebalancing -- Financing: Public Opinion on Financial Transfers to Deficit States -- Diverging Preferences: Public Opinion and Interest Group Preferences in the Euro Crisis -- Voters, Interest Groups, and Eurozone Crisis Politics in Surplus Countries -- Eurozone Crisis Politics in Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands -- Not an Option: External Adjustment -- Vocal Politics of Financing in Surplus Countries -- Context Matters: The Politics of Internal Adjustment -- Germany -- Austria -- Netherlands -- Internal Adjustment in Eurozone Surplus Countries -- Conclusion -- Appendix -- 8. Conclusion -- Three New Perspectives on the Eurozone Crisis -- What's So Special? Analyzing the Eurozone Crisis in a Comparative Perspective -- Examining the Road not Traveled: Policy Alternatives and Trade-Offs -- Looking at Both Sides of the Coin: Crisis Politics in Both Deficit-Debtor and Surplus-Creditor Countries -- Politics of Bad Options in European Crisis Management -- Research Design -- Eurozone Crisis Bargaining between Deficit-Debtor and Surplus-Creditor States -- Policy Implications and Avenues for Future Research -- Appendix.