000			01904cam a2200217 i 4500
005			20260416113207.0
008			130429s2013 nyua b 001 0 eng
020			_a9780393920826 (pbk)
082	0	0	_a330.019 WAT
100	1		_aWatson, Joel
245	1	0	_aStrategy : _ban introduction to game theory / _cJoel Watson
250			_a3rd ed.
264		1	_aNew York : _bW. W. Norton & Company, _c2013
300			_axv, 491 p. : _c24 cm
365			_bRs. 9947.50
505	0		_aPreface -- Introduction -- Representations and basic assumptions -- The extensive form -- Strategies and the normal form -- Beliefs, mixed strategies, and expected payoffs -- General assumptions and methodology -- Analyzing behavior in static settings -- Dominance and best response -- Rationalizability and iterated dominance -- Location, partnership, and social unrest -- Nash equilibrium -- Oligopoly, tariffs, crime, and voting -- Mixed-strategy nash equilibrium -- Strictly competitive games and security strategies -- Contract, law, and enforcement in static settings -- Analyzing behavior in dynamic settings -- Details of the extensive form -- Sequential rationality and subgame perfection -- Topics in industrial organization -- Parlor games -- Bargaining problems -- Analysis of simple bargaining games -- Games with joint decisions negotiation equilibrium -- Unverifiable investment, hold up, options, and ownership -- Repeated games and reputation -- Collusion, trade agreements, and goodwill -- Information -- Random events and incomplete information -- Risk and incentives in contracting -- Bayesian nash equilibrium and rationalizability -- Lemons, auctions, and information aggregation -- Perfect bayesian equilibrium -- Job-market signaling and reputation -- Appendices -- Index.
650		0	_aGame theory.
650		0	_aEconomics _xPsychological aspects.
650		0	_aStrategic planning.
942			_2ddc _cBK
999			_c212307 _d212307