000			02683cam a2200289 a 4500
001			4344576
005			20241009131147.0
008			891221s1990 ctua b 001 0 eng
010			_a 89021463
020			_a9780300056709 (Paperback )
040			_aDLC _cDLC _dDLC
043			_an-us---
050	0	0	_aJC578 _b.S47 1990
082	0	0	_a340.11 _220
100	1		_aShklar, Judith N.
245	1	4	_aThe faces of injustice / _cJudith N. Shklar.
260			_aNew Haven : _bYale University Press, _cc1990.
300			_avii, 144 p. : _bill. ; _c22 cm.
365			_bRs. 2270.00
490	1		_aStorrs lectures on jurisprudence, Yale Law School ; _v1988
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 127-138) and index.
505			_aPreface; Introduction; Giving injustice its due; Misfortunate and injustice; Notes; Index.
520			_aHow can we distinguish between injustice and misfortune? What can we learn from the victims of calamity about the sense of injustice they harbor? In this book a distinguished political theorist ponders these and other questions and formulates a new political and moral theory of injustice that encompasses not only deliberate acts of cruelty or unfairness but also indifference to such acts. Judith N. Shklar draws on the writings of Plato, Augustine, and Montaigne, three skeptics who gave the theory of injustice its main structure and intellectual force, as well as on political theory, history, social psychology, and literature from sources as diverse as Rosseau, Dickens, Hardy, and E. L. Doctorow. Shklar argues that we cannot set rigid rules to distinguish instances of misfortune from injustice, as most theories of justice would have us do, for such definitions would not take into account historical variability and differences in perception and interest between the victims and spectators. From the victim's point of view—whether it be one who suffered in an earthquake or as a result of social discrimination—the full definition of injustice must include not only the immediate cause of disaster but also our refusal to prevent and then to mitigate the damage, or what Shklar calls passive injustice. With this broader definition comes a call for greater responsibility from both citizens and public servants. When we attempt to make political decisions about what to do in specific instances of injustice, says Shklar, we must give the victim's voice its full weight. This is in keeping with the best impulses of democracy and is our only alternative to a complacency that is bound to favor the unjust.
650		0	_aJustice.
830		0	_aStorrs lectures on jurisprudence ; _v1988.
942			_2ddc _cBK
999			_c212832 _d212832