000			02828cam a2200361 i 4500
001			21513186
005			20241113123614.0
008			200427t20212021enk b 001 0 eng d
010			_a 2020937525
020			_a0198866410 _q(hardback)
020			_a9780198866411 _q(hardback)
035			_a(OCoLC)on1191209839
040			_aYDX _beng _cYDX _erda _dBDX _dERASA _dCDX _dOCLCO _dYDXIT _dOCLCF _dPTS _dDLC
042			_alccopycat
100	1		_aShepherd, J. _q(Joshua), _eauthor.
245	1	4	_aThe shape of agency : _bcontrol, action, skill, knowledge / _cJoshua Shepherd.
264		1	_aOxford, United Kingdom ; _aNew York, NY : _bOxford University Press, _c2021.
264		4	_c©2021
300			_aix, 184 pages ; _c23 cm
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia
338			_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (pages [173]-182) and index.
520	8		_a"This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations.0The Shape of Agency offers interlinked explanations of the basic building blocks of agency, as well as its exemplary instances. The first part offers accounts of a collection of related phenomena that have long troubled philosophers of action: control over behaviour, non-deviant causation, and intentional action. These accounts build on earlier work in the causalist tradition, and undermine the claims made by many that causalism cannot offer a satisfying account of non-deviant causation, and therefore fails as an account of intentional action. The second part turns to modes of agentive excellence-ways that agents display quality of form-providing a novel account of skill, including an account of the ways that agents display more or less skill. Shepherd discusses the role of knowledge in skill, and concludes that while knowledge is often important, it is inessential. This leads to a discussion of the way that knowledge of action and knowledge of how to act informs action execution. Knowledgeable action includes a unique epistemic underpinning: in knowledgeable action, the agent has authoritative knowledge of what she is doing and how she is doing it when and because she is poised to control her action by way of practical reasoning"-- _cProvided by publisher.
650		0	_aAgent (Philosophy)
650		0	_aKnowledge, Theory of.
650		7	_aAgent (Philosophy) _2fast _0(OCoLC)fst00800204
650		7	_aKnowledge, Theory of. _2fast _0(OCoLC)fst00988194
856			_uhttps://academic.oup.com/book/40525
906			_a7 _bcbc _ccopycat _d2 _encip _f20 _gy-gencatlg
942			_2ddc _cOAB
999			_c212922 _d212922