000			03470cam a2200373 a 4500
001			13385214
005			20260709162131.0
008			031027s2002 enk b 001 0 eng d
010			_a 2004615542
015			_aGBA2-Y5922
020			_a1-84113-400-7 (paperback)
020			_a9781841134000 (paperback)
035			_a13385214
035			_a(OCoLC)49043778
040			_aUk _cUk _dNBL _dDLC
042			_alccopycat
082	0	4	_a340.112 CAN _221
100	1		_aCane, Peter, _d1950-
245	1	0	_aResponsibility in law and morality / _cPeter Cane.
260			_aOxford, [UK] ; _bHart Pub., _c2002.
300			_axii, 303 p. ; _c24 cm.
365			_bRs. 4927.00
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [285]-296) and index.
505			_a1. Moral and Legal Responsibility - 2. The Nature and Functions of Responsibility - 3. Responsibility and Culpability - 4. Responsibility and Causation - 5. Responsibility and Personality - 6. Grounds and Bounds of Responsibility - 7. Realising Responsibility - 8. Responsibility in Public Law - 9. Thinking about Responsibility - References - Index.
520			_aLawyers who write about responsibility tend to focus on criminal law at the expense of civil and public law; while philosophers tend to treat responsibility as a moral concept,and either ignore the law or consider legal responsibility to be a more or less distorted reflection of its moral counterpart. This book aims to counteract both of these biases. By adopting a comparative institutional approach to the relationship between law and morality, it challenges the common view that morality stands to law as critical standard to conventional practice. It shows how law and morality interact symbiotically, and how careful study of legal concepts of responsibility can add significantly to our understanding of responsibility more generally. Central to this project is a distinction between two paradigms of responsibility -- the criminal law paradigm and the civil law paradigm. Whereas theoretical discussions of responsibility tend focus on conduct and agency, taking account of civil law reveals the importance of outcomes and the interests of victims and society to ideas of responsibility. The book examines from a distinctively legal point of view central philosophical questions about responsibility such as its relationship with culpability (challenging the common view that moral responsibility requires fault), causation and personality. It explores the relevance of sanctions and problems of proof and enforcement to ideas of responsibility, as well as the relationship between responsibility and distributive justice, and the role of concepts of responsibility in public law. At the heart of this book lie two questions: what does it mean to say we are responsible? and, what are our responsibilities? Its aim is not to answer these questions but to challenge some traditional approaches to answering them and more importantly, to suggest fruitful alternative approaches that take law seriously. Table of Contents
650		0	_aLaw and ethics.
650		0	_aResponsibility.
650		0	_aLaw _xMoral and ethical aspects.
650		0	_aLiability (Law)
906			_a7 _bcbc _ccopycat _d2 _encip _f20 _gy-gencatlg
942			_2ddc _cBK
999			_c218026 _d218026