000			03510pam a2200325 a 4500
999			_c24551 _d24551
001			613706
003			OSt
005			20210419152800.0
008			920122s1992 njua b 001 0 eng
010			_a 92002788
020			_a0691043086 (CL) : _c$45.00
020			_a0691003955 (PB) : _c$19.95
040			_aDLC _cDLC _dDLC
050	0	0	_aHB144 _b.G49 1992
082	0	0	_a330.01 GIB _220
100	1		_aGibbons, Robert, _d1958-
245	1	0	_aGame theory for applied economists / _cRobert Gibbons.
260			_aPrinceton, N.J. : _bPrinceton University Press, _cc1992.
300			_axiii, 267 p. : _bill. ; _c25 cm.
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505			_aContents: 1. Static Games of Complete Information; 1.1 Basic Theory: Narmal-Form Games and Nash Equilibrium; 1.1.A Normal-Form Representation of Games; 1.1.B Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies; 1.1.C Motivation and Definition of Nash Equilibriuin; 1.2 Applications; 1.2.A Cournot Model of Duopoly; 1.2.B Bertrand Model of Duopoly; 1.2.C Final-Offer Arbitration; 1.2.D The Problem of the Commons; 1.3 Advanced Theory: Mixed Strategies and Existence of Equilibrium; 1.3.A Mixed Strategies; 1.3.B Existence of Nash Equilibrium; 2 Dynamic Games of Complete Information; 2.1 Dynamic Games of Complete and Perfect Information; 2.1.A Theory: Backwards Induction; 2.1.B Stackelberg Model of Duopoly; 2.1.C Wages and Employment in a Unionized Firm; 2.1.D Sequential Bargaining; 2.2 Two-Stage Games of Complete but Imperfect Information; 2.2.A Theory: Subgame Perfection; 2.2.B Bank Runs; 2.2.C Tariffs and Imperfect International Competition; 2.2.D Tournaments; 2.3 Repeated Games; 2.3.A Theory: Two-Stage Repeated Games; 2.3.B Theory: Infinitely Repeated Games; 2.3.C Collusion between Cournot Duopolists; 2.3.D Efficiency Wages; 2.3.E Time-Consistent Monetary Policy; 2.4 Dynamic Games of Complete but Imperfect Information; 2.4.A Extensive-Form Representation of Games; 2.4.B Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibriuin; 3 Static Games of Incomplete Information; 3.1 Theory: Static Bayesian Ganies and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium; 3.1.A An Example: Cournot Competition under Asymmetric Information; 3.1.B Normal-Form Representation of Static Bayesian Games; 3.1.C Definition of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium; 3.2 Applications; 3.2.A Mixed Strategies Revisited; 3.2.B An Auction; 3.2.C A Double Auction; 3.3 The Revelation Principle; 4 Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information; 4.1 Introduction to Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium; 4.2 Signaling Games; 4.2.A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Signaling Games; 4.2.B Job-Market Signaling; 4.2.C Corporate Investment and Capital Structure; 4.2.D Monetary Policy; 4.3 Other Applications of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium; 4.3.A Cheap-Talk Games; 4.3.B Sequential Bargaining under Asymmetric Information; 4.3.C Reputation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemnia; 4.4 Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium; Index.
650		0	_aGame theory.
650		0	_aEconomics, Mathematical.
650		0	_aEconomics _xMathematical models.
856	4	1	_3Table of contents _uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/prin031/92002788.html
856	4	2	_3Publisher description _uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/prin021/92002788.html
906			_a7 _bcbc _corignew _d1 _eocip _f19 _gy-gencatlg
942			_2ddc _cBK