000			01885nam a2200217Ia 4500
999			_c38102 _d38102
003			OSt
005			20210226102713.0
008			160316s2014 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020			_a9783110342314
040			_cn
082			_a193.000000 _bMEI
100			_aMeixner Uwe
245			_aDefending Husserl : A plea in the case of Wittgenstein & company versus phenomenology
260			_aBolton _bDe Gruyter _c2014
300			_a509p _cxvi
365			_b Gratis
505			_aDescription: The phenomenological approach to the philosophy of mind, as inaugurated by Brentano and worked out in a very sophisticated way by Husserl, has been severely criticized by philosophers within the Wittgensteinian tradition and, implicitly, by Wittgenstein himself. Their criticism is, in the epistemological regard, directed against introspectionism, and in the ontological regard, against an internalist and qualia-friendly, non-functionalist (or: broadly dualistic/idealistic) conception of the mind. The book examines this criticism in detail, looking at the writings of Wittgenstein, Ryle, Hacker, Dennett, and other authors, reconstructing their arguments, and pointing out where they fall short of their aim. In defending Husserl against his Wittgensteinian critics, the book also offers a comprehensive fresh view of phenomenology as a philosophy of mind. In particular, Husserl's non-representationalist theory of intentionality is carefully described in its various aspects and elucidated also with respect to its development, taking into account writings from various periods of Husserl's career. Last but not least, the book shows Wittgensteinianism to be one of the effective roots of the present-day hegemony of physicalism.
650			_a1. Husserl Edmund -1859 - 19382. Wittgenstein Ludwig -1889 - 19513. Phenomenology - Philosophy Of Mind
700			_a _a
942			_2ddc _cBK