Game theory and the law

By:

Rasmusen Eric B

Contributor(s):

Publication details: London Edward Elgar Pub 2007Description: 603p ixISBN:

9781845426408

Subject(s):

1. Law - Methodology2. Game Theory

DDC classification:

340.100000 RAS

Contents:

Contents: Acknowledgements; Introduction Eric B. Rasmusen; PART I GENERAL: 1. Ian Ayres (1990), ‘Playing Games with the Law’; 2. Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, Eric Rasmusen, Jeffrey Evans Stake, Robert H. Heidt and Michael Alexeev (1997), ‘Review Dialogue: On Game Theory and the Law’; 3. Eric A. Posner (2000), ‘Agency Models in Law and Economics’; 4. Franklin M. Fisher (1989), ‘Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View’; PART II BARGAINING AND PROCEDURE; 5. Robert D. Cooter and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1989), ‘Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution’; 6. I.P.L. P’ng (1983), ‘Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial’; 7. Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde (1986), ‘Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs’; 8. Lucien Arye Bebchuk (1996), ‘A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue’; 9. Keith N. Hylton (1994), ‘An Economic Theory of the Duty to Bargain’; 10. Ian Ayres (1991), ‘Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations’; PART III CONTRACTS; 11. Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner (1992), ‘Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules’; 12. Eric B. Rasmusen (2001), ‘Explaining Incomplete Contracts as the Result of Contract-Reading Costs’; 13. J. Mark Ramseyer (1991), ‘Legal Rules in Repeated Deals: Banking in the Shadow of Defection in Japan’; PART IV TORTS, CRIME, AND TAXES; 14. John Prather Brown (1973), ‘Toward an Economic Theory of Liability’; 15. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Yeon-Koo Che (1991), ‘Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation’; 16. Michael J. Graetz, Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde (1986), ‘The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement’; 17. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell (2000), ‘The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law’; PART V COURTS; 18. George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein (1984), ‘The Selection of Disputes for Litigation’; 19. Rafael Gely and Pablo T. Spiller (1990), ‘A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the “State Farm” and “Grove City” Cases’; 20. Frank H. Easterbrook (1988), ‘Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions’; Name Index.

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Holdings
Item type	Current library	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode
BOOKs	National Law School	340.1 RAS (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Available		22346

Contents:
Acknowledgements;
Introduction Eric B. Rasmusen;
PART I GENERAL:
1. Ian Ayres (1990), ‘Playing Games with the Law’;
2. Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, Eric Rasmusen, Jeffrey Evans Stake, Robert H. Heidt and Michael Alexeev (1997), ‘Review Dialogue: On Game Theory and the Law’;
3. Eric A. Posner (2000), ‘Agency Models in Law and Economics’;
4. Franklin M. Fisher (1989), ‘Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View’;
PART II BARGAINING AND PROCEDURE;
5. Robert D. Cooter and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (1989), ‘Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution’;
6. I.P.L. P’ng (1983), ‘Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial’;
7. Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde (1986), ‘Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs’;
8. Lucien Arye Bebchuk (1996), ‘A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue’;
9. Keith N. Hylton (1994), ‘An Economic Theory of the Duty to Bargain’;
10. Ian Ayres (1991), ‘Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations’;
PART III CONTRACTS;
11. Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner (1992), ‘Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules’;
12. Eric B. Rasmusen (2001), ‘Explaining Incomplete Contracts as the Result of Contract-Reading Costs’;
13. J. Mark Ramseyer (1991), ‘Legal Rules in Repeated Deals: Banking in the Shadow of Defection in Japan’;
PART IV TORTS, CRIME, AND TAXES;
14. John Prather Brown (1973), ‘Toward an Economic Theory of Liability’;
15. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Yeon-Koo Che (1991), ‘Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation’;
16. Michael J. Graetz, Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde (1986), ‘The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement’;
17. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell (2000), ‘The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law’;
PART V COURTS;
18. George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein (1984), ‘The Selection of Disputes for Litigation’;
19. Rafael Gely and Pablo T. Spiller (1990), ‘A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the “State Farm” and “Grove City” Cases’;
20. Frank H. Easterbrook (1988), ‘Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions’;
Name Index.

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