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The economics of information : lying and cheating in markets and organizations / Ian Molho.

By: Publication details: Oxford ; Malden, Mass. : Blackwell, 1997.Description: x, 262 p. : ill. ; 23 cmISBN:
  • 0631201521 (alk. paper)
  • 0631206663 (pbk. : alk. paper)
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 306.4/2 21
LOC classification:
  • HB133 .M65 1997
Contents:
1. Introduction: Private Information and Hidden Action. Part I: Adverse Selection: The Market for Lemons. . 2. Quality Uncertainty and the Market for Lemons. 3. Adverse Selection: The Wilson Model. 4. Lemons Problems: Experimental Evidence. Part II: Signalling. 5. Job Market Signalling. 6. Screening: A Self-Selection Mechanism. 7. Further Literature on Signalling Theory. 8. Signalling/Screening Behaviour: Experimental Evidence. Part III: Moral Hazard. 9. Moral Hazard: Shareholder/Management Relations. 10. Moral Hazard: A Principal-Agent Model. 11. Further Literature on Moral Hazard and Agency Theory. 12. Moral Hazard: Experimental Evidence. Part IV: Mechanism Design: Applications to Bargaining and Auctions. . 13. Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principle: A Bargaining Example. 14. Auction Design: Theory. 15. Auction Design: Experimental Evidence. 16. Concluding Comments. Appendix: Brief Notes on Probability Distributions, Baye's Rule, Expected Utility Theory and Game Theory. Index.
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Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Introduction: Private Information and Hidden Action.

Part I: Adverse Selection: The Market for Lemons. .

2. Quality Uncertainty and the Market for Lemons.

3. Adverse Selection: The Wilson Model.

4. Lemons Problems: Experimental Evidence.

Part II: Signalling.

5. Job Market Signalling.

6. Screening: A Self-Selection Mechanism.

7. Further Literature on Signalling Theory.

8. Signalling/Screening Behaviour: Experimental Evidence.

Part III: Moral Hazard.

9. Moral Hazard: Shareholder/Management Relations.

10. Moral Hazard: A Principal-Agent Model.

11. Further Literature on Moral Hazard and Agency Theory.

12. Moral Hazard: Experimental Evidence.

Part IV: Mechanism Design: Applications to Bargaining and Auctions. .

13. Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principle: A Bargaining Example.

14. Auction Design: Theory.

15. Auction Design: Experimental Evidence.

16. Concluding Comments.

Appendix: Brief Notes on Probability Distributions, Baye's Rule, Expected Utility Theory and Game Theory.

Index.